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Methods and Materials in Constitutional Law
Some Thoughts on Access to Government Information as a
Problem for Constitutional Theory and Socio-Legal Studies*
Barry Sullivan"
Abstract
To be subject to law, Hobbes argued, is to be deprived of liberty, as we understand
it. In this respect, democratic governments are no different from others. Hobbes's
insight has not caused us to abandon our commitments to democracy, but it still
challenges us to think hard about the nature of representative government, the
nature of citizenship in a democratic society, and the conditions necessary for ful-
filling the promise of democratic citizenship. Two recent trends are evident. Some
citizens have embraced a more active sense of citizenship, which necessarily entails
a more insistent need for information, while governments have insisted on the need
for greater concentration of governmental power and a higher degree of secrecy.
Much is to be learned from the approaches that various national and transnational
regimes have taken with respect to this problem. This essay will consider the
problem of access to government information from a comparative perspective and
as a problem for constitutional theory and socio-legal studies.
Keywords: Citizenship, democracy, government information, representative gov-
ernment, secrecy.
Introduction
Thomas Hobbes was no friend of democracy. It was not that Hobbes did not think
about democracy. He thought a great deal about it. He simply could not see the
point in it. And his objections to democracy still challenge us today. In Hobbes's
view, to be subject to law is to be deprived of liberty, as we understand it, because,
apart from the inalienable right to life, a subject's liberty is limited to what the
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sovereign or the "silence of the Law" allows.1 It makes no difference whether the
sovereign is a monarch or a democratic body. The alienation of liberty, as we
understand it, is the same. From that perspective, the argument for democracy
can be no more powerful than arguments for any other form of government. 2
Moreover, democracies also fail on their own terms, Hobbes tells us, because
"though the right of sovereignty be in the assembly, which is virtually the whole
body; yet the use thereof is always in one, or a few particular men".3 Nor would
mixed government be an improvement: "if [it] could exist, it would not advance
the liberty of the people at all. For as long as [the branches or estates] are all in
agreement with each other, the subjection of individual citizens is as great as it
could possibly be; but if they disagree, civil war returns, and the right of the pri-
vate Sword, which is worse than any subjection."
Hobbes thought monarchy preferable to democracy, but that view has not
attracted many followers in recent times. Nonetheless, for those committed to
the project of democratic or representative government, Hobbes's reflections still
challenge us to think hard about our own constitutional structures. What kind of
democratic or popular government do we have? What role do our constitutional
structures envision for 'the people', and how are the people to fulfill that role?
How active a role are the people to play? If the role of the people is to be relatively
1 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan in C.B. MacPherson (Ed.), 270-271 (1968). In Hobbes's view, the subject
has already authorized the actions of the sovereign as his own, and cannot therefore have any
claims against the sovereign.
2 In Leviathan, Hobbes writes: "There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great charac-
ters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has
more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantino-
ple. Whether a Commonwealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is the still the same."
Hobbes, Leviathan 266. See generally Q. Skinner, 'Hobbes and Republican Liberty' (2008).
3 T. Hobbes, 'The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic', in J.C.A. Gaskin (Ed.), 120 (1994). In 'The
Elements of Law', Hobbes was particularly concerned with the disproportionate influence that
orators would wield in a body that was not only the domain of all, but one in which decisions
were made in the round by all, where "there is no means ... to deliberate and give counsel what to
do, but by long and set orations". Ibid. But Hobbes was also interested in the inherent instability
of democracy and its tendency to concentrate power in the hands of the few, at the expense of
individual liberty: "When the particular members of the commonwealth growing weary of
attendance at public courts, as dwelling far off, or being attentive to their private businesses, and
withal displeased with the government of the people, assemble themselves to make an aristoc-
racy; there is no more required ... but putting to the question ... the names of such men as it shall
consist of, and assenting to their election; and by plurality of vote, to transfer that power which
before the people had .... " Ibid. at 120-121.
4 T. Hobbes, 'On the Citizen', in R. Tuck & M. Silverthome (Eds.), 93 (1998). In 'De Cive', Hobbes
also argues that monarchy is preferable to democracy on the very practical ground that, "...one of
the disadvantages of sovereign power is that the sovereign may exact other monies apart from
those needed for public expenses", including "monies at his pleasure to enrich his children, rela-
tives, favourites and even flatterers", and that such exactions are common to all forms of govern-
ment, but democracy is the most oppressive in this respect because there are so many "orators
who have influence with the people", and they all have "children, relatives, friends and flatterers to
be enriched". Ibid., 119. According to Hobbes, "Because a Monarch's ministers, slaves and friends
are not numerous, he can more or less satisfy them without expense to the citizens, by confer-
ring on them the offices of war and peace; in a Democracy where there are many to satisfy and
always new ones coming along, it cannot be done without exploiting the citizens." Ibid.
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passive, their need for information may not be great or immediate. If the people
are to be actively involved in government, however, they will need information,
some of which may be accessible only through the government, and they will need
it on a timely basis. But government cannot function entirely in the round. How
can political and legal systems most effectively ensure that citizens have access to
the information they need, while also protecting the effectiveness of govern-
ment? Government secrecy presents a critical set of issues for representative gov-
ernment.
The purpose of this essay is not to try and answer those questions, but to
suggest how we might profitably think about them. They can be approached, of
course, from the perspectives of political philosophy and constitutional theory,
but this essay will be more concerned with whether, how, and why specific consti-
tutional and legal arrangements may work in practice. Montesquieu, after all, did
not teach us that theoretical principles apply equally in all circumstances, or that
one set of constitutional arrangements will be equally appropriate for all
nations.s On the contrary, Montesquieu recognized that law is a part of culture,
and that the success of law depends not only on its rationality, but also upon its
relationship to other components of culture, including, most importantly, "the
humour and the disposition of the people in whose favor it is established".6 In
Montesquieu's view, laws "should be adapted in such a manner to the people for
whom they are made, as to render it very unlikely for those of one nation to be
proper for another".' To be effective, law must fit the circumstances.
Joseph Story, the nineteenth century jurist and scholar, followed Montes-
quieu in this respect when he passed judgment on John Locke's Carolina constitu-
tion of 1669: "Perhaps in the annals of the world there is not to be found a more
wholesome lesson of the utter folly of all efforts to establish forms of govern-
ments upon mere theory; and of the dangers of legislation without consulting the
habits, manners, feelings, and opinions of the people, upon which they are to
operate."8 Like Montesquieu, Story thought that legal arrangements should suit
5 See C. Montesquieu, 'The Spirit of Laws', in D. Carrithers (Ed.) (1977). Montesquieu wrote that,
"Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth; the
political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which this human
reason is applied." Ibid., 104.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 104-105.
8 J. Story, 'Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States', in R. Rotunda & J. Nowak
(Eds.), 58 (1987). Locke acted as a classical legislator or lawgiver with respect to the framing of
this constitution. In this respect, it is important to note the distinction between constitutional-
ism and democracy, as well as the distinction between the adoption of a constitution through
democratic procedures and the provision for democratic procedures within the constitution. See,
e.g., W. Murphy, 'Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy', in D. Greenberg, S. Katz &
M. Oliviero (Eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, at 3
(1993).
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the circumstances.9 Even then, there is room for debate about the effectiveness of
law. Adam Podgorecki, the great sociologist of law, described two opposite views
of law; one view takes law to be an omnipotent agent of social change, while the
other view assumes that law can only "sanction the existing state of affairs".10 In
fact, as Professor Podgorecki suggested, law is neither impotent nor omnipotent.
Moreover, we know that law is not static, but changes as society changes.'1
Constitutional law, like law generally, is a part of culture and necessarily
interacts with other parts of culture.12 Law changes culture, and culture changes
law. After several centuries of experience with written constitutions, quasi-con-
stitutional statutes, and ordinary public law legislation at the national level, as
well as an increasing volume of constitution-like law at the regional and interna-
tional levels, we have much data, and much theory, to work with. There is much
to be learned from looking at these questions through the lenses of comparative
law and socio-legal studies.
Part I
Unlike Hobbes, the American founders did not think that mixed government was
unattainable or unworkable; they believed that such a government could be con-
structed on principles of representation, federalism, and separated powers.13
They were less enthusiastic about giving a strong or central role to the people. In
9 Justice Story may have had a different view with respect to the common law. See Swift v. Tyson,
41 US 1, 19 (1842) ("[Tihe true interpretation and effect [of contracts and other instruments of a
commercial nature] are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general
principles of commercial jurisprudence [...] The law respecting negotiable instruments may be
truly declared [.. to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the com-
mercial world.")
10 A. Podgorecki,'Law and Society' 247 (1974).
11 E.H. Levi presented the classic demonstration of this fact more than 60 years ago. See E. Levi,'An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning' 46-47 (1948). As Professor Levi shows, this process of change
characterizes statutory and constitutional interpretation as well as common law development.
Statutory and constitutional text may channel and direct the flow of legal change, but they can-
not prevent it. Ibid.
12 See generally L. Rosen, 'The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society' (1989);
P. Kahn,'The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship' (2000).
13 The framers were conscious, of course, of the magnitude of the challenge they faced. In Federal-
ist 1, Publius wrote: "It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the
people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice,
or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and
force." A. Hamilton, J. Madison & J. Jay, 'The Federalist', in J. Cooke (Ed.), at 3 (1961). The
framers adopted Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers, whereby the power of govern-
ment is divided and the branches of government are set against each other to protect individual
liberty. See Montesquieu, supra note 6, 201-214. In the United States, the powers of government
are further separated and divided by the institution of federalism. So strong was the American
founders' faith in federalism and the separation of powers that many of them thought that a sep-
arate bill of rights was unnecessary. In Federalist 84, Publius argues that, "The truth is [...] that
the constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF
RIGHTS." Hamilton, Madison & Jay, supra note 14, at 581.
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Federalist 51, for example, Publius wrote that, "a dependence on the people is no
doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught man-
kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions".14 Indeed, too great a dependence on
the people presented its own problems. Thus, in designing "a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige
it to control itself". In truth, this was not to be a system of government that
depended greatly on the oversight of the people. The principal protection of lib-
erty was to be found elsewhere: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place."16
This model recognizes the people as the ultimate source of government; it
also ensures that certain political rights, such as freedom of speech, press, reli-
gion, assembly, and petition, will not be abridged by the national government,
and it specifically preserves the rights to habeas corpus, to be free from cruel and
unusual punishments, and to be tried by a jury of one's peers in criminal cases. As
Publius emphasized in Federalist 63, however, the government created by the
Constitution was not to be a democracy in the ancient sense; it was to be a repre-
sentative government.17 The rule of the people was to be largely indirect, and the
franchise would be limited in various ways.18 The president was to be elected by
an electoral college, and the method for choosing the electors was left to the state
legislatures. 9 The members of the Senate were to be chosen by the state legisla-
tures,20 and, although the Federal Convention eventually decided that the lower
house should be elected directly by the people, 21 some delegates favored indirect
14 Ibid. at 349. It is far from obvious which of these controls is to be 'primary', and which 'auxiliary'.
Moreover, a control may be 'ultimate', but not 'primary'.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 427-428.
18 The Constitution essentially left to the states the power to determine qualifications for the fran-
chise. See U.S. Const. Art. I, para. 2, cl. 1 ("the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature"). On the other hand,
representation was apportioned based on total population, including slaves, who were counted as
three-fifths of a person. Ibid. at Art. I, para. 2, cl. 3. It was the latter feature that caused the aboli-
tionist William Lloyd Garrison to call the Constitution "a covenant with death, and an agreement
with hell". R.F. Wallcut, 'Selections from the Writings and Speeches of William Lloyd Garrison'
140 (1852). More recently, Justice Thurgood Marshall bluntly reminded us that "the government
[the founders] devised was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war,
and momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its
respect for the individual freedoms and the human rights, that we hold as fundamental today".
T. Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, at
2 (1987).
19 U.S. Const. Art. II, para. 1, cl.2-3.
20 Ibid. at Art. I, para. 3, cl.1.
21 Ibid. at Art. I, para. 2.
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election for both Houses. 22 The Executive could negate the work of the legislative
branch, subject to reversal by supermajorities in both Houses. 23 The Constitution
made no provision for any power of popular initiative or referendum or recall, as
some later constitutions would. In other words, lawmaking at the national level
belonged to the two political branches, which were insulated in important ways
from too great a dependence on the people.
It does not overstate the point to suggest that there was not much for the
people to do, at least at the national level of government, under this scheme. 24
Indeed, one is reminded of Roger Cotterrell's summary of Max Weber's account of
the citizen's role in bureaucratic society: "to obey law and perhaps, in periodic
elections, to confirm the choice of leaders whose election gives them the power to
enact into law whatever policies they see fit".25 Professor Cotterrell adds: "In so
doing leaders are guided only by expediency, personal vision, and the legal
restraints of the constitution which, if adhered to, confer unchallenged legitimacy
on their acts."26
Given the limited role envisioned for the people, the limited mandate given
to the federal government, and the founders' emphasis on the diffusing and
checking of governmental power as the principal means of controlling govern-
ment, it is not surprising that the Constitution contained no express provision
concerning access to government information, 27 as some later constitutions
would.28 The framers did their own work behind closed doors, but they also lived
in an age when governments did not produce or gather (or have the kind of
monopoly over) the massive amounts of information they now do. Perhaps it is
22 See A. Koch, 'Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787'. Reported by James Madison,
38-45 (1966). For example, Madison reported that "M[r.] Sherman opposed the election by the
people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately
should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are con-
stantly liable to be misled". Ibid., 39.
23 See U.S. Const., Art. I, para. 7, cl. 2.
24 Of course, the founders also contemplated that the national government would be a government
of limited powers, with most powers - although not those relating to defense, foreign policy, and
commerce - remaining with the states.
25 R. Cotterrell, 'Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective' 149 (1995).
26 Ibid.
27 The phrase 'government information' is meant here to include information about the govern-
ment as well as information held by the government. The two categories will often overlap, and
some information 'about the government' will have originated as 'information held by the gov-
ernment'. The distinction is worth keeping in mind, however, because the two categories present
discrete legal problems. If information remains secret, the legal issues will involve access. If
information originated with the government, but subsequently was made public, the legal issues
may involve the possibility of 'prior restraint', but are more likely to involve questions relating to
the criminal culpability of the source and the publisher. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
403 US 713 (1971).
28 The Constitution does require each House of Congress to keep a journal of its proceedings, U.S.
Const. Art. I; para. 5, cl. 3, and the President is required "from time to time to give to the Con-
gress Information of the State of the Union". Ibid. at Art. II, para. 3. Sweden, on the other hand,
apparently provided a right of access to government information in the eighteenth century. See
D. Rowat, The Right to Government Information in Democracies, 48 International Review of Admin-
istrative Sciences 59, at 61-62 (1982).
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anachronistic to expect otherwise, but the founders do not appear to have been
greatly concerned about the problem of excessive government secrecy. Of course,
members of the House would face election every two years, and some early mem-
bers regularly communicated with their constituents through circular letters,
which sought to explain the members' views on selected matters of public con-
cern.29 Subsequent changes in text and jurisprudence have greatly increased the
constitutional role of the people, but the original understanding retains much of
its power. For example, some US scholars, like Thomas Emerson and Alexander
Meiklejohn, have endeavored to find a broad right to political freedom, including
a right of access to information, in the First Amendment,3 0 but others reject that
view on the ground that no such interpretation of the First Amendment can be
squared with the limited role assigned to the people in the US form of representa-
tive government.3 1
Until the early twentieth century, there was not much First Amendment liti-
gation in the US. 32 Nor was there much litigation over access to government
information. Just as the US Constitution contained no express provision relating
to popular access to information, there also was little ordinary law on the subject.
To the extent that the government released information to the public, it was
largely because a particular release suited the government's political purposes.
Similarly, congressional access to Executive branch information was largely deter-
mined through political interactions between the two branches. The US was in no
way exceptional. It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that
access to government information became an issue of general concern in the US
and elsewhere.
Unlike the First Amendment, which speaks only in terms of the right to speak
freely,33 certain international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of
29 See 'Circular Letters of Congressmen to their Constituents, 1798-1829', in N. Cunningham, Jr.
(Ed.) (1978). The use which members made of this practice apparently differed significantly by
region and was most popular among members from the south and west. See ibid. at xxiii.
30 See, e.g., T. Emerson, The First Amendment and the Right to Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to
Know, 1976 Wash. U. L. Q. 1 (1976); A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. Ct. Rev. 245 (1961); A. Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.
461 (1953). See also H. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment', 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191 (1964); A. Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public
Institutions: The First Amendment as a Sword, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1980). For a brief time, the
Supreme Court spoke in such terms as well. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964) (Brennan, J.) ("For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government."); Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (White, J.) ("It is
the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged by
Congress or by the FCC.")
31 See, e.g., L. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle,
68 Cal. L. Rev. 482 (1980).
32 In an early case, Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of Massachusetts, trenchantly observed that
a man had the right to talk politics, but not to be a policeman. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bed-
ford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
33 Of course, the First Amendment also protects such other rights as the right to petition the gov-
emnment, the right to religious freedom, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly.
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Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, give explicit tex-
tual recognition to the right to receive information.34 From that beginning, access
to government information has come to be re-conceptualized in many legal con-
texts as a problem for resolution by law, rather than simply as a matter for politi-
cal bargaining; it has also come to be seen as a problem involving the people
directly, rather than simply their representatives. Many constitutional democra-
cies, such as Canada, Ireland, and the US enacted ordinary legislation to ensure
greater public access to government information.35 Similar concerns in some of
the newer democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, such as Poland and Hun-
gary, and in South Africa, led to the explicit inclusion in new constitutional texts
of broad constitutional guarantees relating to access to information, with statu-
tory provisions being adopted to elaborate on those constitutional provisions. 36
Part II
Notwithstanding recent developments, access to government information
remains uneven. In recent years, for example, the US has embarked on at least
one devastatingly expensive and possibly unnecessary war based on information
which the Executive knew to be false, but nonetheless chose to disseminate to the
nation and the world community." In the aftermath of that debacle, a new US
administration has spoken frequently about the need for greater transparency,
while acting as if important information should be protected from the people, not
made available to them.38 In recent months, important information about the
conduct of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been made available to the pub-
34 The Universal Declaration provides that, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19. The European Convention provides that, "Everyone
has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless
of frontiers." ECHR Art.10.
35 See Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (Canada); Freedom of Information Act, 1997
and Freedom of Information Act, 2003 (Ireland); 5 U.S.C. para. 552(b) (US). Australia and New
Zealand also enacted such laws in 1982. See Freedom of Information Act 1982 (as amended)
(Australia); Official Information Act 1982 (New Zealand). In 2000, the UK enacted the Freedom
of Information Act 2000. Executive officials have sometimes come to regret their acquiescence in
such measures, as Tony Blair did with respect to the Freedom of Information Act 2000. See
T. Blair,A Journey: My Political Life 129, 305 (2010).
36 See Constitution of Republic of Hungary, Ch. XII, Art. 61; Constitution of Republic of Poland, Ch.
II, Art. 51; Constitution of Republic of South Africa, Ch. 2, para. 32.
37 See J. Mearsheimer, 'Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying In International Politics' 49-55
(2011) (describing the 'deception campaign' waged by the Bush Administration to overcome
resistance to war with Iraq). See also H. McGee & K. Murray, Blair Says Stretching the Truth for
Greater Good is Common Sense, Irish Times, 4 September 2010, <www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/
frontpage/2010/0904/1224278206258.html>.
38 See, e.g., B. Ivry, Treasury Shielding Citigroup with FOIA Deletions, Bloomsburg News, 25 October
2010, <www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-25/u-s-treasury-shielding-of-citigroup-with-dele-
tions-make-foia-meaningless.html>.
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lic, not by the government, but by a shadowy organization called WikiLeaks,
which has published vast quantities of purloined documents, apparently based on
the absolute belief that no amount of government secrecy can ever be justified.39
In addition, an emergent popular movement, mainly characterized by a deep dis-
trust of government and a strong sense of alienation from it, has had a significant
impact on recent US congressional elections and appears ready to exercise a simi-
lar influence on the work of Congress.40 There are many possible explanations for
the sense of alienation and distrust that many Americans feel towards their gov-
ernment. One reason is the sharp split that exists in the country over specific
questions of public policy, such as health care, economic recovery, and immigra-
tion reform. One suspects, however, that another, not insubstantial reason is the
seemingly incorrigible penchant for secrecy among those responsible for govern-
ment.
Recent years have witnessed an important, ongoing process of adaptation
and transformation in democratic institutions, especially with respect to the
growth of executive power and government secrecy. These adaptations have been
particularly dramatic and significant in the US, especially since the attacks of
11 September 2001, but one should not therefore be tempted to view these
developments as peculiar to the US, to its particular form of representative
government, or to the demands of the period. Developments in the US are not
simply related to the increased sense of vulnerability and fear of terrorism that
followed the September 11, 2001 attacks; some of these developments were mani-
fest long before the beginning of the last decade.41 The growth of presidential
39 See B. Keller, Dealing With Assange and the Secrets He Spilled, New York Times, 26 January 2011,
<www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/3OWikileaks-t.html?_r=1&ref=global-home>.
During 2010, WikiLeaks released a 2007 video showing Iraqi civilians and journalists being killed
by US forces, more than 76,900 documents concerning the Afghan war, almost 400,000 docu-
ments relating to the Iraq war, and thousands of pages of US diplomatic cables. See, e.g., S. Elli-
son, The Man Who Spilled The Secrets, Vanity Fair, February 2011, <www.vanityfair.com/politics/
features/2011/02/the-guardian-201102>. See also G. Newey, Diary: Life With WikiLeaks, London
Review of Books, 6 January 2011, at 39, <www.1rb.co.uk/v33/nOl/glen-newey/diary> ("Previous
whistle-blowers like Ellsberg and Clive Ponting acted as lone individuals, opening cans of worms
that had come to their notice while in official employ. WikiLeaks institutionalizes such acts of
individual conscience, as a kind of anti-Ministry of Truth."). Some members of Congress have
responded to WikiLeaks by proposing legislation to criminalize the 'knowing and willful' dissemi-
nation of classified information concerning the "human intelligence activities of the United
States", thus providing a means of prosecuting those who disseminate such information as well
as those who steal or otherwise acquire it in the first instance. See G. Stone, A Clear Danger to
Free Speech, New York Times, 4 January 2011, <www.nytimes.com/2011/01/04/opinion/
04stone.html?>
40 See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Conservative Advice for a Congress of Professors, Washington Post, 6 January
2011, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artide/2011/01/05/AR2011010503918.
html?wpisrc=nlmost>.
41 See B. Sullivan, 'The Irish Constitution: A View from Abroad' in 0. Doyle & E. Carolan (Eds.), The
Irish Constitution: Governance and Values, 1 at 30 (2008); B. Sullivan, 'Justice Jackson's Republic
and Ours' in H.J. Powell & J.B. White (Eds.), Law and Democracy in the Empire of Force, 172, at
188-189 (2009).
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power in the US is an old story.42 Abraham Lincoln certainly took an expansive
view of his powers during the Civil War,4 3 but, as one US historian has recently
noted "[t]he tendency toward presidential aggrandizement accelerated during the
20th century".44 Gary Wills, a prominent commentator, has emphasized the
secrecy surrounding the development of the atomic bomb and Congress's subse-
quent determination, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, to provide the president
with an unreviewable discretion to deploy the bomb.4 5 Wills argues that the mag-
nitude of that grant of authority was so enormous as to transform the nature of
the presidency. 46
The increased dominance of the executive branch has not been restricted to
the US, however; the formal and informal aggrandizement of executive power and
the newly insistent demands of government secrecy are widespread and seem evi-
dent in representative governments of various types.4 7 In the UK, for example,
Gordon Brown, during the long run-up to his succession to the leadership,
acknowledged this accretion of power and asserted the need for a "new constitu-
tional settlement" that would give more power to Parliament with respect to such
things as declarations of war and ministerial appointments. 48
These trends toward greater secrecy and concentration of governmental
power run contrary, of course, to the previously-discussed trends, namely, the
growing demand for greater access to government information and the wide-
42 See, e.g., E. Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001); C. Sunstein &
L. Lessig, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994): S. Calabresi & S. Pra-
kash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541 (1994).
43 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 US 2 (1866).
44 See T. Surgrue, Levittown to Laos, London Review of Books, 22 July 2010, at 32 (attributing this
acceleration to "the dramatic expansion of executive power during the first half of the century,
the growth of the national security state during World War Two and the Cold War, and, most
important, the ability of radio and then television to project the president's voice and image into
nearly every home in the country".).
45 G. Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State 23, 45 (2010). See also
J. Palfrey, The Problem of Secrecy, 290 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 90 (1953) (describing challenge to democratic government posed by culture of secrecy
surrounding atomic energy).
46 Wills, supra note 45, 46-47 ("Lodging the 'fate of the world' in one man, with no constitutional
check on his actions, constituted a violent break with our whole governmental system. ... The
nature of the presidency was irrevocably altered. ... The President's permanent alert meant our
permanent submission. ... We were told that we must honor and protect 'our Commander-in-
Chief - the 'our' referring to the entire citizenry. ... [Under our Constitution, however, the] Pres-
ident has no power, as Commander-in-Chief, over any civilian."). See Youngstown Tube & Sheet Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-644 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) ("There
are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country, its industries
and its inhabitants.").
47 See Sullivan, The Irish Constitution:A View from Abroad, supra note 42, at 29-32 (2008).
48 See, e.g., Gordon's Manifesto for Change, The Sunday Times, 13 May 2007, at <www.timeson-
line.co.uk/tol/news/politics/articlel782142.ece>. We also know that efforts to invoke access to
information laws may exact great personal costs, even in democratic societies. See L. Polgreen,
High Price for India's Information Law, New York Times, 22 January 2011, at <www.nytimes.com/
2001/01/23/world/asia/india23.html>.
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spread reconceptualization of the problem of access as one to be resolved by law,
rather than politics.4 9 One step towards understanding the interaction of these
trends is to consider the specific form that new approaches to transparency and
access to information have taken in various countries, that is, whether the prob-
lem has been left to legislation or raised to a constitutional level, and what differ-
ence, if any, that might make.50
Whether any particular right becomes enshrined in constitutional text or is
left for legislative protection may depend on a number of factors, including both
traditional practices and theoretical concerns about what sorts of matters may or
should be taken up at a constitutional level, as well as contingent factors such as
what rights seem particularly important at the time a new constitution is being
framed or when important amendments are being proposed. Whether enshrine-
ment in a constitutional text actually makes a difference is an interesting ques-
tion, and the answer probably depends on numerous factors in addition to the
decision to constitutionalize or not. The following sections of this essay will seek
to investigate that question in a preliminary way by comparing several cases from
the US and Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-Ameri-
can Court.
Part III
US courts have not construed the First Amendment to include a right of access to
government documents. In 1966, however, Congress enacted the Freedom of
49 In 1982, one commentator attributed the widespread acceptance of government secrecy in dem-
ocratic societies to its continuity from the period of absolute monarchy and the failure of parlia-
mentary institutions and the public to challenge it because of the 'strong inherited tradition'. See
D. Rowat, The Right to Government Information in Democracies, supra note 29, at 59 (1982). Swe-
den was the exception, having recognized a right of access to government information since the
eighteenth century. Ibid. at 61-62.
50 One possible point of distinction between constitutions and statutes is that constitutions gener-
ally are assumed to be more permanent than statutes. Of course, constitutions come in many
shapes and sizes. They may be amended with varying degrees of difficulty; they may be adaptable
to change or uncertainty in other ways as well; they may hold various places in their respective
societies; and their respective societies may treat them with varying degrees of seriousness or
respect. In addition, they may provide authoritative answers to some questions, but not to oth-
ers, either because a resolution could not be reached; because a resolution was reached but could
not be properly verbalized; or because the problem was not one that the framers could or did
foresee. See H. Powell, Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision 87, 105
(2008). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (US Constitution
was "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs".). Finally, as Jacek Kurczewski, the Polish sociologist of law, has observed,
there may be circumstances in which "'illegal' legal transactions constitute the greater part of the
legal life of the population". J. Kurczewski, Living Sociology of Law 53 (2010). That is true of con-
stitutions as well. Constitutional cultures may manifest themselves as much through unconstitu-
tional or extra-constitutional transactions as through transactions that comply with the written
instrument. See, e.g., J. Kurczewski & B. Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democracies,
65 Law and Contemporary Problems 251 (2002).
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Information Act (FOIA), 5 which created a statutory right of access to certain
types of government information, subject to specific conditions and exemptions.
And, while the US Constitution no longer contains many of the anti-democratic
features it once did, and the role of the people is not formally bounded as it once
was, the construction and application of FOIA continue to be influenced by the
limited role originally envisioned for the people.
Indeed, there has been ambivalence about FO1A from the beginning, at least
in part because it was not clear how the concept of arming citizens with govern-
ment information fit into our basic theory of representative government. Presi-
dent Johnson, who signed the legislation in 1966, apparently thought that the
idea was a terrible one and had to be taken "kicking and screaming" to the signing
ceremony. 52 In 1975, Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, together with
Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, persuaded President Ford to veto certain
amendments, although the veto was later overridden.53 In 1982, then-Professor
Scalia criticized strengthening FOIA on the ground that Congress, rather than the
public or the press, was the proper party to insist on the production of informa-
tion by the executive. 54
Not surprisingly, this ambivalence about the people's 'right to know' often
manifests itself with special force in cases involving 'sensitive' information. Two
of the cases that the government has litigated since 9/11 - Center for National
Security Studies v. US Department of Justice55 and ACLU v. Department of Defense56
- suggest the ease with which the right of access to government information may
be overcome when such information is at stake.57
FOIA contains nine exemptions, which allow (but do not require) the govern-
ment to withhold certain records or parts of records from mandatory disclosure.
Exemption 1, the national security exemption, permits the withholding of mat-
ters that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by [presiden-
tial] Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or for-
51 5 U.S.C. para. 552.
52 See B. Moyers, Bill Moyers on the Freedom of Information Act, Now with Bill Moyers at
<www.pbs.org/now/commentary/moyers4.html>; W. Ginsberg, Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA): Issues for the 111th Congress, 1 n.2 (Congressional Research Service, 12 August 2009).
53 See Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of Information Norms: Scalia, Rumsfeld, Cheney Opposed
Open Government Bill: Congress Overrode President Ford's Veto of Court Review, in D. Lopez, T. Blan-
ton & M. Fuchs (Eds.), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 142, 23 November
2004, <www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/>.
54 A. Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, Regulation, Mar.-Apr. 1982, 15, at 19
(1982). Justice Scalia also suggested that the excellence of the original legislation consisted in
the appearance it gave of affording access to government information without actually burden-
ing the government with rigorous compliance requirements. Ibid.
55 331 F.3d 918 (D.C.Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
56 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
57 Edward S. Corwin, the great scholar of the presidency, long ago remarked that the constitutional
provisions relating to foreign policy were 'an invitation to struggle'. E. Corwin, The President:
Office and Powers 1781-1984, at 201 (1984). More recently, Giorgio Agamben has argued that the
'struggle' implicitly endows the American executive with emergency powers similar to those
expressly contained in European constitutions. G. Agamben, State of Exception 19 (2005).
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eign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such order".58 In nei-
ther of these two cases did the government formally invoke Exemption 1, but the
government did rely on national security concerns to support its withholding of
the requested information in both cases.
In the first case, Center for National Security Studies v. US Department of Jus-
tice,59 several NGOs, including the American Civil Liberties Union, sought infor-
mation concerning hundreds of persons of Arab ethnic background and Muslim
religious faith who were arrested and detained by the US government in the after-
math of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The NGOs sought details concerning the
names and citizenship of the detainees, the times and locations of their arrests,
the reasons for their arrests, the times and locations of their detentions, the
times and places of their releases (if they were released), the names of their law-
yers, and other similar information."o The government declined to provide any of
that information to the requesters, relying on Exemption 7, but chose to release
publicly the names of some of the detainees, as well as their alleged links with
international terrorism.
Exemption 7 permits the government to withhold records compiled for law
enforcement purposes to the extent that one of the six subparts of the exemption
applies." In denying the NGOs' FOIA request, the government relied on Parts A,
C, and F of Exemption 7: Part (A) protects records from mandatory disclosure to
the extent that they "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings".62 Part (C) permits withholding to the extent that production "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy".63 Part (F) permits withholding to the extent that production "could reason-
ably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual".64
When the NGOs sought judicial review of the administrative denial of their
requests, the government defended its refusal to comply by submitting two very
conclusory sworn statements.65 The district court held that some of the material
was exempt from disclosure, but most was not.6' On appeal, a three-judge panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by a
two-to-one vote, held that everything - including the identities of the lawyers -
was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(A) because any disclosure "could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings". The majority
58 5 U.S.C. para. 552(b) (1). Although Exemption 1 requires that the courts make a de novo determi-
nation as to the propriety of classification, the courts routinely defer to the government's affida-
vits. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (if agency affidavit con-
tains "reasonable specificity" and "information logically falls within claimed exemption," court
should not "conduct a more detailed inquiry to test the agency's judgment").
59 331 F.3d 918.
60 Ibid., 922.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 923.
66 Ctr. for Nat7 Sec. Studies v. Dep't. of Justice, 215 F.Supp. 2d 94, 113 (2002), rev'd, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
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thought that courts should not be in the business of second-guessing the execu-
tive." In addition, even though the government had not sought to show compli-
ance with Exemption 1, the court thought that it should be mindful of the gov-
ernment's national security concerns, and should therefore defer to the govern-
ment's determination, as if Exemption 1 had been formally invoked and its rigor-
ous requirements satisfied. One judge dissented in a well-reasoned and hard-hit-
ting opinion.68 He noted that there might be some legitimate reason for with-
holding specific bits of information, but that "the court's uncritical deference to
the government's vague, poorly explained arguments for withholding broad cate-
gories of information about the detainees, as well as its willingness to fill in the
factual and logical gaps in the government's case, eviscerates both FOIA itself and
the principles of openness that FOIA embodies".69 The Supreme Court denied fur-
ther review.
In the second case, ACLU v. Department of Defense,70 the American Civil Liber-
ties Union sought disclosure of certain photographic records that presumably
showed the mistreatment of detainees being held at locations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Again, the government made no production. On judicial review, the govern-
ment invoked several exemptions to justify its categorical nonproduction, includ-
ing, among other things, Exemption 7(C), which authorizes the withholding of
law enforcement records to the extent that disclosure "could reasonably be expec-
ted to constitute an unwarranted invasion of person privacy". *7 As in Center for
National Security Studies, the government did not specifically rely on Exemption 1,
the national security exemption.
The government seemed in search of a theory to justify its determination and
eventually also invoked Exemption 7(F), asserting that disclosure of the request-
ed records "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of
any individual". In a highly unusual move, the government did not mention
Exemption 7(F) until after the case had been briefed, argued orally, and submit-
ted for decision in the district court. At that point, the government submitted a
supplemental brief, in which it argued that that the court should uphold its dis-
cretionary decision under Exemption 7(F)." Although the government asserted
that disclosure of the requested photographic records "could reasonably be expect-
ed to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual", the government did
not point to any particular individual whose life or physical safety might be put at
risk. Instead, the government argued that publication of the requested photos
would enflame the "Arab street", thereby endangering American and coalition
forces and American civilians generally.73 (By that time, the Abu Ghraib photos
67 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 932.
68 Ibid., 937 et seq.
69 Ibid., 937.
70 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
71 Ibid., 64.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 67.
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had been released by third parties on the internet and were no longer at issue.)74
The district court ordered disclosure of the records. The court rejected most of
the government's arguments outright and specifically found that redaction would
prevent any "unwarranted invasion of privacy".7
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the lower court, and expressly rejected the govern-
ment's broad reading of Exemption 7(C). The court found that the words "any
person" could not be read as broadly as the government suggested. The court also
rejected the view that, notwithstanding the government's decision not to rely on
Exemption 1, a broad reading of Exemption 7(F) was nonetheless justified by
national security considerations. The court's decision was announced a few weeks
before the 2008 presidential election, and the Bush administration asked to have
the case reconsidered by the full court. But that request was denied in early 2009,
and the new administration announced that it would not seek Supreme Court
review because the case was "hopeless" and unwinnable.7 6
Within a few weeks, the administration reversed course.7 7 In a brief press
appearance, with no opportunity for questions, President Obama announced that
the government would seek Supreme Court review and do everything in its power
to keep the photos secret. He emphasized that "these photos are not particularly
sensational, especially when compared to the painful images we remember from
Abu Ghraib", but that their release would nonetheless "impact on the safety of
our troops".7 ' The government petitioned for Supreme Court review, making far-
reaching claims about the proper meaning and application of Exemption 7(C).
Later, Congress passed a Freedom of Information Act amendment authorizing
the Secretary of Defense to withhold any or all of the photographs, the president
signed the bill, and the secretary withheld the requested photographs.7 9 At the
74 See, e.g., S. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, The New Yorker, 10 May 2004, <www.newyorker.com/
archive/2004/05/10/040510fa fact>; The Abu Ghraib Files, Salon.com, 14 March 2006,
<www.salon.com/news/abu-ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/index.html>; New Abu Ghraib
Images Broadcast, BBC News, 15 February 2006, <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/
4715540.stm>.
75 ACLUv. Dep't of Defense, 543 F.3d at 91.
76 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, 24 April 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/briefing-white-house-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-42409>.
77 The time was brief, but eventful. The president had recently released the Bush administration's
torture memos, and he had announced his intention to close Guantanamo. See M. Mazzetti &
W. Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantanamo, New York Times, 22 January
2009, <www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html>; E. MacAskill, Obama Releases
Bush Torture Memos, Guardian, 16 April 2009, <guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aprl6/torture-
memos-bush-administration>. Some military officials and Senators were not happy.
78 Statement by the President on the Situation in Sri Lanka and Detainee Photographs, 13 May
2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-presudent-situation-sri-lanka-and-
detainee-photographs>.
79 President Obama signed the bill on October 28, 2009. See Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act 2010, §565, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142. The Secretary of Defense
exercised his statutory discretion to withhold the photographs on November 13, 2009. See Sup-
plemental Brief for Petitioners, at Appendix B, Dep't of Defense v. American Civil Liberties Union,
130 S. Ct. 777 (2009) (No. 09-160) 2009 WL 3824781.
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government's request, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision,
thereby depriving it of any precedential value.80
What can be said about the legislative response to the ACLU decision? Mem-
bers of both Houses, over a period of several months, proposed various versions
of the FOIA amendment that Congress eventually adopted, but there was virtu-
ally no floor discussion of the amendment in either house. Virtually the only
explanation given by its sponsors was that the legislation was necessary to pro-
tect the safety of American troops and civilians. Senator Graham said: "There are
a lot of mysteries in this world, but there is no mystery on what would happen if
we release these photos. I can tell you, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that if those
photos get into the public domain, they will inflame populations where our
troops are serving overseas and increase violence against our troops."8 1 One
Republican member of Congress went so far as to say that there would be "blood
on this Administration's hands" if it were to acquiesce in the release of the pic-
tures.82 Like the president, several senators asserted that the American people
had nothing to learn from the photos, but they insisted on talking about "allega-
tions" of misconduct, suggesting that there was indeed something more to be
learned.83
Virtually no opposition was expressed. Not a single congressional voice was
raised in support of the public's right to see the photographs for themselves and
to make a judgment about whether the photographs added anything useful to
their knowledge of what the government was doing - or allowing to be done - in
their name. Would these events have played out as they did if the right of access
to government information had constitutional stature? Would the president have
capitulated so easily to the demands of a few key members of the Senate? Would
other members of the House or Senate have been more willing to express their
views on the desirability of suppressing this information?
Part IV
Canada enacted its Access to Information Act (ATIA) 84 in 1982, the same year
that saw the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the
Canadian courts have treated ATIA as a "quasi-constitutional enactment".85 The
stated purpose of ATIA is to provide a right of access to government documents
"in accordance with the principles that government information should be availa-
ble to the public, that necessary exceptions ... should be limited and specific and
that decisions on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed
independently of government".86 The effectiveness of the Act was questioned vir-
80 Dep't of Defense v. ACLU, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009).
81 155 Cong. Rec. S5672 (20 May 2009).
82 155 Cong. Rec. H6548 (11 June 2009).
83 155 Cong. Rec. S6787, S6790 (18 June 2009).
84 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1.
85 See Dagg v. Canada (Minister ofFinance) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403.
86 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1, s.2.
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tually from the start,87 and there have been many unsuccessful proposals for
strengthening its disclosure requirements.88 In the past decade, the effectiveness
of the Act has been further compromised by the Canadian government's actions
with respect to the 'war on terror'.89 As one commentator has suggested, "Entirely
legitimate concerns of national security have exacerbated an underlying issue
that cannot be ignored; namely, the issue of commitment. ... Neither politicians
nor public servants can honestly be said to enjoy the scrutiny that a well-placed
access request can generate."90 Canada, like the US, has seen challenges to its
treatment of citizens and others, and has asserted bold claims concerning execu-
tive authority and secrecy.91
In two recent cases, the federal trial courts substantially upheld the govern-
ment's invocation of ATIA exemptions to protect sensitive information related to
the 'war on terror', although the judgment in one of the cases was later reversed
on appeal because the government had failed to show that the minister had
actually exercised discretion when she withheld the documents. In Attaran v. Can-
ada (Minister of Foreign Affairs),92 the trial court upheld the minister's s. 15 (1)
denial of a university professor's request for unredacted copies of the Department
of Foreign Affairs' annual human rights reports for Afghanistan for 2002 through
2006. The court held that the government was required to "satisfy the Court on
the balance of probabilities through clear and direct evidence that there will be a
reasonable expectation of probable harm from disclosure of specific information",
and that "specific detailed information" is necessary to "distinguish between con-
fidentiality justified by the Act and that resulting from an overly cautious
approach".93 In fact, the government submitted affidavits which were quite simi-
lar to those submitted in the US cases and relied greatly on the purported knowl-
edge and experience of the affiants. 94 Nonetheless, the court found in favor of the
government, stating that it could not "ignore, discount, or substitute the Court's
opinion for the clear evidence and opinion of a commander in the Canadian
forces and a senior official at the Department of Foreign Affairs".95 The appellate
court reversed because the government's evidence was not sufficient to show that
the minister understood that she had discretion under s. 15 (1), let alone that she
87 The government that sponsored ATIA was soon after voted from office, and the new government
had much less enthusiasm for the Act. See, e.g., M. Rankin, The Access to Information Act 25 Years
Later: Toward a New Generation of Access Rights in Canada, 21 Canadian Journal of Administrative
Law and Practice 323 (2008).
88 Rankin, The Access to Information Act 25 Years Later, supra note 88, at 325.
89 In Canada, as in the US, the government's response to the threat of terrorism has been contro-
versial. See, e.g., Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations
(2006), www.ararcommission.ca.
90 Rankin, The Access to Information Act 25 Years Later, supra note 88, at 325-326.
91 See, e.g., Craig Forcese, Through a Glass Darkly: The Role and Review of 'National Security' in Cana-
dian Law, 43 Alberta Law Review 963 (2006).
92 2009 F.C. 339, rev'd, 2011 F.C.A. 182.
93 Ibid., para. 43.
94 Ibid., para. 37-42.
95 Ibid., para. 47.
European Journal of Law Reform 2011 (13) 120
HeinOnline  -- 13 Eur. J.L. Reform 20 2011
Methods and Materials in Constitutional Law
had exercised that discretion in a reasonable manner. In Kitson v. Canada (Minis-
ter of Defence)," the trial court upheld the withholding of information relating to
the prisoners taken by Canadian troops during Operation Medusa in September
2006, including the number of prisoners taken, the places where they were
detained, and their current whereabouts. Based on open and ex parte affidavits,
the court found that the government's withholding of the information was rea-
sonable under the Act.97
In June 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada was required to consider
whether the Charter of Rights and Freedoms itself encompasses a right to receive
government information. In Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Law-
yers' Association,98 the Canadian Lawyers' Association sought access to certain
Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) reports concerning allegations of abusive conduct
by local police and prosecutors in connection with a murder prosecution. A crimi-
nal trial judge had found "many instances of abusive conduct", but a later OPP
investigation exonerated the local police and prosecutors, without giving any rea-
sons for doing so. In response to the Lawyers' Association's request under the
provincial Freedom of Information Act, the OPP invoked the solicitor-client and
law enforcement privileges; the invocation of those privileges was not subject to
96 2009 F.C. 1000.
97 Ibid. A third case, which did not involve ATIA, also warrants brief mention. In Minister of Justice
v. Khadr [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125, the Canadian Supreme Court held that Omar Khadr, a Canadian
detainee who had been interrogated by Canadian officials at Guantanamo and was subject to US
criminal charges, was entitled to have a judicial officer review the Canadian officials' notes to
determine the extent to which they could be released, consistent with legitimate national secur-
ity concerns. Ibid. If Khadr had been prosecuted in Canada, he would have had that right under
the principle established in Regina v. Stinchcombe [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. Since Khadr was not being
prosecuted in Canada, he sought access to the information under Section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms para. 7 (1982)
("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice"), <laws.jus-
tice.gc.ca/en/charter>. The Court found that para. 7 applied because Canadian officials had par-
ticipated in processes that violated US and international law, as well as Canada's binding interna-
tional human rights obligations. Ibid., para. 27. In a later case, the Supreme Court declined, on
separation of powers grounds, to affirm lower court orders directing the government to remedy
its violations of Khadr's Charter rights in a specific way, that is, by requesting his repatriation.
See Prime Minister of Canada v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R 40. The Court stated that, "in the case of
refusal by a government to abide by constitutional constraints, courts are empowered to make
orders ensuring that the government's foreign affairs prerogative is exercised in accordance with
the constitution". Ibid., para. 37. The Court found, however, that the lower court's remedy "gives
too little weight to the constitutional responsibility of the executive to make decisions on mat-
ters of foreign affairs [...]". Ibid., para. 39. Thus, "the appropriate remedy is to declare that, on
the record before the Court, Canada infringed Mr. Khadr's para. 7 rights, and to leave it to the
government to decide how best to respond to this judgment in light of current information, its
responsibility for foreign affairs, and in conformity with the Charter". Ibid
98 [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815.
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"public interest review" under Section 23 of the Act.99 Among other things, the
Lawyers' Association maintained that the provincial parliament's failure to make
those two exemptions subject to the public interest override rendered the over-
ride provision unconstitutional under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which provides that everyone has the fundamental rights
to "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication".100 The Supreme Court was therefore
required to construe Section 2(b) to determine whether that section provided any
right to government information.
The Canadian Court held that "§ 2(b) guarantees freedom of expression, not
access to information", and that it does not therefore "guarantee access to all
documents in government hands".10' The Court emphasized that under the Cana-
dian form of government, bureaucracy is accountable to elected officials, who, in
turn, must "conduct their business in the context of public elections and legisla-
tures and where the media [...] play a fundamental role".102 Thus, it is "not possi-
ble to proclaim that § 2(b) entails a general constitutional right of access to all
information under the control of government". 0 3 According to the Court, how-
ever, "[aiccess is a derivative right which may arise where it is a necessary precon-
dition of meaningful expression on the functioning of government".104 Thus, "the
scope of the § 2(b) protection includes a right to access to documents only where
access is necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of public impor-
tance, subject to privileges and functional constraints". 0 5
A party seeking information must make out a prima facie case of 'necessity' by
showing that "without the desired access [to documents held by the government],
meaningful public discussion and criticism on matters of public interest would be
substantially impeded".' If that showing is made, the party seeking access must
then "show that the protection is not removed by countervailing considerations
inconsistent with production".107 Those "countervailing considerations" may be
embodied in common law privileges or in the recognition that "a particular gov-
99 Section 23 of the Act authorizes the provincial Information Commissioner to reject the govern-
ment's invocation of some (but not all) exemptions based on the public interest: "An exemption
from disclosure of a record under sections 13 [advice to government], 15 [relations with over
governments], 17 [third-party information], 18 [economic and other interests of Ontario], 20
[danger to safety or health], 21 [personal privacy], and 21.1 [species at risk] does not apply where
a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose of the
exemption."
100 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms para. 2(b).
101 1 S.C.R. 815, para. 30.
102 Ibid., para. 35.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., para. 30.
105 Ibid., para. 31.
106 Ibid., para. 37, 38.
107 Ibid., para. 38.
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emnment function is incompatible with access to certain documents".1os Here, the
Court concluded, the absence of a public interest override did not render Section
23 unconstitutional because the authority responsible for determining whether
to release the requested records already was required to determine "whether dis-
closure could reasonably be expected to interfere with a law enforcement matter",
and, if so, to decide "whether, having regard to the significance of that risk and
other relevant interests, disclosure should be made or refused".' 09 According to
the Court, those determinations "necessarily involve consideration of the public
interest in open government, public debate and the proper functioning of govern-
ment institutions".110 The public interest override "would add little to this pro-
CS.111cess".1
Notwithstanding the absence of specific constitutional language, the
Supreme Court found a limited right of access in the Charter, but only to the
extent that the requested information "is necessary for the meaningful exercise of
free expression on matters of public or political interest".112 Three points may be
made with respect to that result. First, the decision obviously contemplates that
most access to information will be resolved under ATIA (and its provincial coun-
terparts), with invocation of the Charter being a matter of last resort for only the
most exceptional cases. Second, the 'right' recognized by the Court is not an indi-
vidual right in the way that we generally think of such rights. It is instrumental in
nature; it does not exist for the sake of the individual, but for the common
108 Ibid., para. 39, 40. The Court noted that, "Since the common law and statutes must conform to
the Charter, assertions of particular categories of privilege are in principle open to constitutional
challenge. However, in practice, the outlines of these privileges are likely to be well-settled, pro-
viding predictability and certainty to what must be produced and what remains protected." Ibid.,
para. 39. To illustrate those government functions which are incompatible with public disclosure,
the Court noted that, "it might be argued that while the open court principle requires that court
hearings and judgments be open and available for public scrutiny and comment, memos and
notes leading to a judicial decision are not subject to public access". Ibid., para. 40.
109 Ibid., para. 48.
110 Ibid. Indeed, according to the Court, "a proper interpretation of §14(1) requires that the [decid-
ing authority] consider whether a compelling public interest in disclosure outweighs the purpose
of the exemption". Ibid., para .49. If the deciding authority "were to find that such an interest
exists [he] would exercise the discretion conferred . .. and order disclosure". Ibid. In addition, the
Court found that the same analysis was required with respect to the other provisions of Section
14. See Ibid., para. 50-52. In addition, the Court found that the same analysis applied, "perhaps
even more strongly, to the exemption for documents protected by solicitor-client privilege". Ibid.,
para. 53. The Section 23 public interest override would have little to add, since Section 19, like
Section 14, grants discretion to disclose notwithstanding the privilege. However, "the near-abso-
lute nature of [the] solicitor client privilege" makes it difficult to see how disclosure could ever be
justified. Ibid., para. 54-56.
111 Ibid., para. 49. The Court found that the statute passed constitutional muster, but remanded to
the Information Commissioner for further consideration of whether the deciding authority had
properly exercised his discretion under Section 14. Ibid., para. 72.
112 Ibid., para. 36.
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good.113 Third, the decision is respectful of the political branches, but also consis-
tent with the particular Canadian conception of judicial responsibility under its
distinctive 'living tree' doctrine, which emphasizes the organic quality of the basic
law.114
Part V
This section will discuss two cases in which denials of access to government infor-
mation were considered in a somewhat different context, namely, as challenges to
alleged violations of transnationally-recognized rights raised in transnational
courts. The first is a 2009 decision of the European Court of Human Rights; the
second is a 2006 decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Cases
like these add additional levels of rich description for the socio-legal study of con-
stitutional law because of the sets of relationships that exist between domestic
constitutional law and transnational law, which sometimes may use substantially
the same language, but be subject to differing interpretations, as well as the struc-
tural and political relationships that exist between the transnational court and
the nation-state and its courts and other organs of government.
In TarsasagA Szabadsagiogokert (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) v. Hungary,115
the Hungarian Constitutional Court had denied a request of the Hungarian Civil
Liberties Union (HCLU) for access to a pending complaint that a parliamentarian
(and others) had filed in the Constitutional Court, seeking "abstract review" as to
the constitutionality of certain recent drug-related amendments to the Criminal
Code. The request had been denied on the ground that a pending complaint
"could not be made available to outsiders without the approval of its author".116
HCLU then brought suit in the Budapest Regional Court, arguing that the denial
of access violated Article 61 of the Hungarian Constitution, which provides that
"everyone has the right to express freely his/her opinion and, furthermore, to
113 This approach is reminiscent of Professor Meiklejohn's insistence that freedom of speech is not
based on "a sentimental vagary about the 'natural rights of individuals', but on a reasoned and
sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the public safety". A. Meildejohn,
Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 59 (1965).
114 See Edwards v. Attorney General of Canada [1930] A.C. 124 ("The British North America Act plant-
ed in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of
the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. Like all written constitutions it has been subject
to development through usage and convention.").
115 ECHR (2009), no. 37374/05.
116 Ibid., para. 10. The Constitutional Court never contacted the author, who had given a press con-
ference about the complaint. Ibid.
European Journal of Law Reform 2011 (13) 124
HeinOnline  -- 13 Eur. J.L. Reform 24 2011
Methods and Materials in Constitutional Law
access and distribute information of public interest".1 17 Notwithstanding the
completion of the "abstract review" case, the regional and appellate courts reject-
ed HCLU's claims. Taking the case to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), HCLU claimed that the Hungarian courts had violated its rights under
Article 10 of the European Convention.1 18 Article 10 guarantees freedom of
expression, which is defined to include "freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers".
In its argument to the ECHR, Hungary acknowledged its interference with
HCLU's Article 10 rights, but argued that the interference was justified under
Article 10.2, which provides that the exercise of those rights
...may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the inter-
ests of national security, territorial integrity, or public safety, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the pro-
tection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.119
According to Hungary, its legal regime "met the requirements laid down in the
Convention, in that it was prescribed by law, it was applied in order to protect the
rights of others and it was necessary in a democratic society".12 0 The ECHR found
that there had been a violation of Article 10. First, the Court noted its long-stand-
ing recognition of the principle that "that the public has a right to receive infor-
mation of general interest", and held "the most careful scrutiny on the part of the
Court is called for when the measures taken by the national authority are capable
of discouraging the participation of the press, one of society's 'watchdogs', in the
117 Ibid., para. 16. HCLU also challenged the denial under the Data Act 1992, but the Hungarian
courts rejected those claims as well. When access is protected at the constitutional level, imple-
menting legislation may also be required to guide the executive and the courts in enforcing the
constitutional provision. Ironically, Hungary has recently enacted a law restricting press freedom
that has been soundly criticized in other quarters, including the European Parliament. See S. Cas-
tle, European Union Deputies Confront Hungarian Leader over Law on News Media, New York Times,
20 January 2011, <www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/world/europe/20hungary.html?>. South
Africa, which also protects access to information at the constitutional level, also has been the
object of much criticism regarding the curtailment of speech and press freedoms through legisla-
tion. See, e.g., S. Moss, Nadine Gordimer Goes Back Into Battle: Twenty Years After Helping Defeat
Apartheid, the Eminent Writer is Fighting Government Plans to Muzzle South Africa's Press, Guardian,
31 August 2010, <www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/aug/31/nadine-gordimer-fighting-censor-
ship>.
118 Art. 10 provides in relevant part that, "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers." ECHR Art. 10.1.
119 ECHR Art. 10.2. Hungary also specifically relied on the Court's 'margin of appreciation' jurispru-
dence.
120 Ibid.
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public debate on matters of legitimate public concern".121 Second, the Court
noted that "the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may become a form
of censorship" if obstacles to information-gathering are created, and held that
HCLU qualified as a 'watchdog' like the press for these purposes. Finally, the
Court held that the Constitutional Court's "monopoly of information ... amoun-
ted to a form of censorship" and "clearly impaired" HCLU's right to impart infor-
mation.122
The ECHR also found that Hungary's interference with Article 10 rights could
not be justified as "necessary in a democratic society". While recognizing that "it
is difficult to derive from the Convention a general right of access to administra-
tive data and documents",123 the Court held that the present case "essentially
concerns an interference - by virtue of the censorial power of an information
monopoly - with the exercise of the functions of a social watchdog, like the press,
rather than a denial of a general right of access to official documents". 124 Accord-
ing to the Court, "the State's obligations in matters of freedom of the press
include the elimination of barriers to the exercise of press functions where, in
matters of public interest, such barriers exist solely because of an information
monopoly held by the authorities".125 Thus, where the Hungarian courts found no
right of access to government information under Article 61 of the Hungarian
Constitution, the ECHR interpreted very similar language in Article 10 of the
European Convention to provide such a right for the press and 'social watchdogs'
in cases where the government's monopoly on information would otherwise cre-
ate barriers to press freedom.
The second decision, Claude Reyes v. Chile,126 comes from the Inter-American
Court. The case originated when Chile's Foreign Investment Committee refused
the request of several Chilean citizens (including a member of Congress) for
access to foreign investment and other information concerning entities engaged
in deforestation. 127 The then-effective domestic constitution "did not contain
provisions concerning the right of access to State-held information and the prin-
ciples of transparency and disclosure of the Administration".128 The requesters
filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, invoking
Article 13.1 of the Convention, which provides that, "Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of
121 HCLU v. Hungary, ECHR (2009), no. 37374/05, para. 26.
122 Ibid., para. 28.
123 Ibid., para. 35. The Court also noted, however, that it had "recently advanced towards a broader
interpretation of the notion of 'freedom to receive information'".
124 Ibid., para. 36.
125 Ibid.
126 Claude Reyes v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (2006), <www.oas.org/dil/
accesstoinformation human_rightCaseof_ClaudeReyes..et al vsChile.pdf>.
127 The Court noted that the case did not concern an absolute refusal to release information,
because the state complied partially with its obligation to provide the information it held. Claude
Reyes, para. 75.
128 Ibid., para. 33.
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one's choice."1 29 Thereafter,13 0 the Commission filed an application with the
Inter-American Court, which upheld the right of access. Noting that Article 13
protected the right to 'seek and receive' information, the Court observed:
This article protects the right of the individual to receive such information
and the positive obligation of the State to provide it, so that the individual
may have access to such information or receive an answer that includes a jus-
tification when, for any reason permitted by the Convention, the State is
allowed to restrict access to the information in a specific case. ... The delivery
of information to an individual can, in turn, permit it to circulate in society,
so that the latter can become acquainted with it, have access to it, and assess
it. In this way, the right to freedom of thought and expression includes the
two dimensions, individual and social, of the right to freedom of thought and
expression that must be guaranteed simultaneously by the State.13 1
In addition, the Court observed, "Democratic control by society, through public
opinion, fosters transparency in State activities and promotes the accountability
of State officials in relation to their public activities. Hence, for the individual to
be able to exercise democratic control, the State must guarantee access to the
information of public interest that it holds." 132 The Inter-American Court noted
that Article 13.2 authorizes member states to impose restrictions on the right of
access to government information, but that any such restrictions must be regu-
larly established by law, necessary to ensure "respect for the rights or reputations
of others" or "the protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals", "intended to satisfy a compelling public interest", and "proportionate to
the interest that justifies it". The Court held that Chile had not satisfied those
requirements in this case. 133
As with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Tarsasag A
Szabadsagiogokert, the judgment of the Inter-American Court in Claude Reyes took
a broad view of the language of the American Convention. In Tarsasag A Szabad-
129 American Convention On Human Rights, Art. 13.1. Section 2 of Article 13 further provides that,
"The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior
censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly
established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a. respect for the rights or reputations of
others; or b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals." Ibid.,
Art. 13.2. Finally, Article 13.3 provides that, "The right of expression may not be restricted by
indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint,
radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by
any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions."
Ibid., Art. 13.3.
130 The requesters filed their petition with the Commission in 1998, but the Commission did not file
its application with the Court until 2005. Claude Reyes para. 1.
131 Ibid., para. 77.
132 Ibid., para. 87.
133 Moreover, Chile had not satisfied its obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to "adopt, in
accordance with their constitutional processes and provisions of this Convention, such legislative
or other measures as may be necessary to give the necessary measures to give effect to those
rights or freedoms [referred to in Article J]". Convention. Art. 2.
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sagiogokert, the European Court found a right of access to government informa-
tion, at least in the case of a government monopoly of information, in the words
of the Convention that guaranteed the general right "to access and distribute
information of public interest". In Claude Reyes, the Inter-American Court found
the same right in the language of the American Convention which guaranteed the
"freedom to seek, receive, and impart information".
Conclusions
It is far too early to draw any firm conclusions from legal provisions and decisions
such as those considered in this essay. In the US and Canada, the right of access
to government information has been statutory, rather than constitutional. The
effectiveness of those statutes in providing access to routine government infor-
mation has been uneven. Even more problematic, however, has been their effec-
tiveness in securing access to information that a government official with some
degree of formal or informal authority has thought to be 'sensitive', for one rea-
son or another.134 That is particularly true, as the US cases show, where someone
waves the flag of 'national security'. In such circumstances, the national courts
have been reluctant to exercise an independent judgment. That is not surprising.
For the courts to do more than they have done in policing the executive, and mak-
ing sure that the executive has legitimate reasons for withholding information,
necessarily subjects the courts to criticism for 'interfering' with the political
branches.13 5 The decision in Ontario (Public Safety and Security) suggests that the
Canadian courts may be willing to go further, but only in a truly extraordinary
case, where they believe that the democratic process is being frustrated in a fun-
damental way by the government's unwillingness to disclose information that
citizens truly need to know to exercise their responsibilities as citizens.
As previously noted, the post-1989 constitutions have often provided for
access to information as a constitutional right or value. That is hardly surprising.
After all, most of those constitutions were adopted by nations that were emerging
from some form of authoritarian regime, and those responsible for constitution-
making were familiar with the instinct of governments to try and protect them-
134 See, Office of the Information Commissioner (Ireland), The Application and Operation of Certain
Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1997: Commentary of the Information Commissioner,
Dublin, Ireland, March 2003; E. Kenny, Running Scared of Freedom of Information, Irish Times,
13 February 2003; Office of the Information Commissioner (Ireland), Freedom of Information: The
First Decade, Dublin, Ireland, May 2008; House of Commons, Parliament of Canada, The Access to
Information Act: First Steps to Renewal: Report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information,
Privacy and Ethics, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, Ottawa, Ontario, June 2009; M. Lister &
K. Baird, Access to Information at 25 Years: New Perspectives, Creative Solutions?: Workshop Out-
comes Report, Public Policy Forum, Ottawa, Ontario, December 2008; B. Pack, Note, FOIA Frus-
tration: Access to Government Information Under the Bush Administration, 46 Arizona Law Review
815 (2004); D. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (2010).
135 See generally J. Waldron, 'Law and Disagreement' (1999); J. Waldron, 'The Dignity of Legislation'
(1999); R. Ekins, Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law, 119 Law Quarterly Review 127 (2003);
B. Ackerman, At the Crossroads: Bruce Ackerman on the Surrender of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 32
London Review of Books 33, 9 September 2010.
European Journal of Law Reform 2011 (13) 128
HeinOnline  -- 13 Eur. J.L. Reform 28 2011
Methods and Materials in Constitutional Law
selves from the people.136 These constitutional provisions are impressive. But
there is not yet much case law relating to them, and the existing case law often
involves relatively mundane matters such as access to court pleadings or hospital
records, rather than politically sensitive and important information, such as that
relating to foreign affairs and national security. If Tarsasag A Szabadsagiogokert
(Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) v. Hungary37 is representative, national courts
may be reluctant to grant relief even in such relatively minor matters. Moreover,
constitutional provisions, to be effective, often require legislative elaboration; but
the record with respect to legislation is also mixed. TarsasagA Szabadsagiogokert is
instructive for yet another reason: HCLU eventually received relief, but that relief
came from the European Court, which gave a different construction to the lan-
guage of the European Convention, which was quite similar to the language con-
tained in the Hungarian Constitution. A transnational court may have more free-
dom to "say what the law is",1s8 but there may be danger in that too. If there is
reason to be concerned with the 'political' role of national courts, there is also rea-
son to be concerned when transnational courts take on that role.
As the European Court recognized in Tarsasag A Szabadsagiogokert, one of the
great powers of modern government is the ability to create and collect informa-
tion and control access to it. That circumstance presents a real challenge for the
accountability of representative government, particularly, as Hobbes noted,
where the political branches of government are aligned, as they may be more
often than Publius supposed, either for legitimate reasons of state or because
they share responsibility for failed policies.139 The public may be able to discover
information in the fullness of time. In important matters, however, timing is
often crucial. In today's world, public access to government information is essen-
tial both to the workings of representative government and to public confidence
in government. The conditions on which access to information is made available
to the public are therefore critical.
We must be concerned with the shape that law takes in the world, and with
the reasons that the law takes one shape or another. Traditional scholarship in
constitutional law is incomplete without investigation into how law works on the
ground and how it relates both to other elements of culture and to transnational
legal cultures. Otherwise, it cannot begin to explain such phenomena as the infor-
mal migration of power from the legislative to the executive, despite constancy in
the forms of law. Nor can it begin to understand the reality of the differences and
similarities that exist among and between constitutional systems. And it cannot
begin to explain why national and transnational courts may interpret the same
language in different ways. Constitutional law, to build on the insights of Mon-
tesquieu and Story, necessarily involves contingent arrangements and requires an
understanding of law in action. The truth of that fact will only become more obvi-
136 See generally J. Kurczewski, Living Sociology of Law, supra note 51.
137 ECHR, no. 37374/05 (2009).
138 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137 (1803).
139 Hobbes, 'On the Citizen', supra note 5 at 93; Skinner, 'Hobbes and Republican Liberty', supra
note 3, at 106.
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ous as we have more and more experience observing the wide array of democratic
constitutions we now see at work in the world.
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